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Thirty-six years ago, Tom Jackson suggested that corporate bankruptcy
law can best be explained and defended as the terms of an implicit bargain
among creditors.1 This assertion is founded on a belief that creditors, as a
group, prefer bankruptcy’s collective process to a grab race among themselves,
particularly when such a race may cause the demise of a viable going concern.
Since Jackson’s article, scholars have discussed and debated whether
creditors need to rely on bankruptcy’s bargain for collective action. Some
have contended that creditors could in fact contractually arrange for a
collective process and that the law should permit them to do so. Others have
argued that the impediments to such a contractual arrangement would be too
daunting. With rare exception, though, participants in this dialogue assumed
that creditors desire some form of collective process, whether provided by
statute or contract. That is, while implementation was debated, the
collectivization premise went mostly unchallenged.
The recent transformation of the bankruptcy process from a forum of
reorganization to, largely, an auction block further supports the
collectivization premise. A collective process may not seem attractive when it
† Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business and Associate Dean for Information Systems
and Technology, New York University School of Law.
1 Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 859-71 (1982).
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features the contests inherent in reorganization, described colorfully by Sol
Stein as a feast for lawyers.2 But the bankruptcy process may appear in a more
favorable light when it is used simply to conduct an orderly sale of the
debtor’s assets, including a sale as a going concern if that configuration of
assets garners the highest bid.
All may seem well, then, in the world of bankruptcy, where the apparent
confluence of theory and practice led Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen
to declare the end of bankruptcy,3 by which they meant that bankruptcy has
evolved to its ideal. But there is a fly in the ointment.
At a series of recent conferences attended by academics and practitioners,
the latter have suggested, sometimes expressly, that if freed from legal
constraint, creditors they know would not only contract out of bankruptcy
but out of any collective proceeding. That is, at least some practicing
lawyers—presumably not immersed in Jacksonian orthodoxy—seem to
believe that their clients would like to engage in a grab race after all,
consequences be damned.
Do these lawyers, who represent sophisticated lenders, simply mean that
their clients favor a competition in which they would occupy a privileged
position? Perhaps. But this seems unlikely because in a functioning capital
market, creditors are mere stakeholders who are forced by the market to pay
for any privilege in the form of lower interest rates. Sophisticated lenders,
along with their lawyers, well understand this.
But perhaps a better explanation for why lenders might forgo collectivization
exists: debtors would insist on interest rates possible only if the debtor obtained
funds within a capital structure designed to throw the firm to the creditor wolves
in the event of an uncured default. This conjecture is not new. I first raised the
idea years ago in dissent to the collectivist hegemony. What is new, and the focus
of this Article, is the extent to which the conjecture is supported by recent
developments in bankruptcy practice and creditor activism.
I. THE CREDITORS’ IMPLICIT BARGAIN
On the desirability of collective action, almost all were Jacksonians once,
myself included. In an article I wrote some years ago,4 I invoked Thomas
Jackson to explain that, at its core, bankruptcy serves creditors as a group
when it supplants individual creditor debt collection remedies with a
2 See SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 303 (1999) (“[Chapter 11] is a refuge
for a few opportunists and a feast for many lawyers. For the leaders of businesses trapped in it,
Chapter 11 is the twentieth-century equivalent of the eighteenth-century pillory, a dehumanizing,
inefficient public spectacle.”).
3 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002).
4 Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 812-13 (1994).
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“collective debt-collection device.”5 In theory, as I said then, bankruptcy’s
collectivized proceeding is superior to individual creditor actions because
individual creditors have perverse incentives to act in their own interests,
even if those interests disserve the creditors’ collective interest. Thus, I joined
the consensus that bankruptcy is beneficial to the extent it protects creditors
from their own worst instincts.
To elaborate slightly, assume a debtor firm operates a business worth
more as a going concern than if its assets were sold piecemeal. That is, the
assets are worth more as parts of the debtor’s business than they are
distributed separately to become parts of other businesses. Assume further
that the debtor is subject to obligations even greater than the value of the
firm as a going concern and that the debtor is in default on those obligations.
The debtor has insufficient assets to pay all creditors in full, so each creditor
may have an incentive to collect on its debt before the debtor’s assets are
depleted by other creditors’ collections. In the absence of bankruptcy law, a
creditors’ race to the assets could divide those assets piecemeal, with each race
winner taking a piece of the debtor large enough to satisfy its own claim. As
a result, the creditors could take from the debtor assets worth in the aggregate
only the piecemeal liquidation value.
Foundational to the Jacksonian creditors’ bargain paradigm is that, without
bankruptcy law, a potentially destructive creditor grab race would be inevitable.
The premise is that such a race—rather than an actual bargain among
creditors—would occur because each creditor would know that it could be left
without recourse to any assets if it delayed its own action on the mere hope that
the creditors would both find one another and agree to act collectively. This
presumed dilemma of coordination presents a collective action problem.
Bankruptcy solves a creditors’ collective action problem by disallowing
individual creditor action. A bankruptcy court supervises the use and
disposition of the debtor’s assets and can hold the assets together to maximize
their value. The court then divides the value of the assets among creditors in
an orderly fashion, either through the sale of the assets to a third party and
the distribution of sale proceeds or through the distribution of interests in a
debtor freed from prebankruptcy obligations. In no instance does an
individual creditor have an opportunity to withdraw vital assets unilaterally.
In the illustration above, for example, the bankruptcy court would
prohibit individual creditor action and could sell the debtor’s business as a
going concern or distribute securities in the firm with an aggregate worth
equal to the value of the firm as a going concern. This sale or distribution
would thus preserve the debtor’s going-concern surplus. Such bankruptcy
intervention is thought to reflect a hypothetical creditors’ bargain or the
5

THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 (1986).
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solution the creditors would reach could they solve their coordination
problems. Accordingly, bankruptcy’s solution to the collective action problem
is the chief justification for its elimination of individual creditor remedies.
Douglas Baird has summarized this analysis as follows: “[W]e may not desire
a world without bankruptcy because the self-interest of creditors leads to a
collective action problem, and a legal mechanism is needed to ensure that the
self-interest of individuals does not run counter to the interests of the group.”6
II. A CREDITORS’ EXPRESS BARGAIN
Against this background, a number of scholars considered the possibility
that creditors desirous of collective action need not rely on an implicit
bargain. Rather, they might enter an actual bargain that deprived individual
creditors of unilateral collection rights. Robert Rasmussen, for example,
suggested that bankruptcy law could be adopted, or forgone, by a corporate
debtor based on a selection from options in a federal register that he
proposed.7 David Skeel suggested allowing states to draft their own
insolvency laws applicable to companies incorporated under the laws of that
state.8 My own proposal was that debtors could, possibly even under extant
law, adopt a charter provision that foreswore the issuance of traditional debt,
which would be replaced by investment instruments that I called Chameleon
Equity. Such instruments would allow a firm to retain the benefits of debt’s
fixed obligations with automatic—in today’s jargon “self-executing”—
conversion to debt on uncured default.9
Whether ruled by a menu selection in a federal register, a debtor’s choice
of state corporate law, or a charter provision applicable under the laws of any
state, a creditor who loaned to a debtor subject to a particular set of insolvency
rules could be deemed to have chosen a bargain reflected in those rules.10 And
6 Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 184.
7 See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 51, 100 (1992) (“[A] menu of bankruptcy-law selections . . . allows those in the best position

to make the decision to select which bankruptcy term maximizes their expected value.”).
8 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 513 (1994) (arguing that state regulation of corporate bankruptcy is the “most
promising response to the inefficiencies of the current regime”).
9 See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 324 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political Theories] (explaining that a
Chameleon Equity holder “would possess the same right as a creditor to set payments from the firm,
but it would not be permitted to collect individually on an obligation in default”). That article
elaborated on a suggestion published earlier. See generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation].
10 To be sure, nonconsensual creditors do not make voluntary loans and cannot be said to have
chosen any insolvency regime. For this reason, as I have argued elsewhere, tort creditors should have
highest priority in any insolvency regime. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 9, at
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while one might say that only the charter provision, which would restrict
investment contracts to terms required by those provisions, could properly be
labeled an actual bargain among creditors, with choice of law by the debtor
imposed on creditors without actual assent, this would be a mere quibble. By
contrast to a single federal bankruptcy rule that overrides any state law or
charter provision, any method through which creditors can choose to extend
credit under one set of rules or another can, for most purposes, be considered
an actual bargain.11
As I have observed previously in fleshing out how a contractual alternative
to bankruptcy might look, it is useful to distinguish bankruptcy policy, by which
I mean collective action policy, from issues of general concern. A tenet of the
Jacksonian paradigm is that legal provisions directed to the latter need not be
part of an insolvency regime. It follows that if there is no need for a legal
mechanism to prevent a creditors’ grab race, there is no need for any sort of
special insolvency regime. The contractual collective-action mechanism that I
proposed, born of a thought experiment about a world without debt, suggests
that there is no need for any legal mechanism beyond contract enforcement to
ensure collective action, and thus, no need for corporate bankruptcy law or any
special insolvency regime.
Of course, the simplest contractual alternative to bankruptcy as an
insolvency process is for firms to issue only common equity, which eliminates
the possibility of insolvency, or to issue debt only to a single creditor, which
eliminates any collective action problem among creditors. But it had long been
believed that such a response to the risks of insolvency would be unworkable.
A firm might rationally issue fixed obligations, even ignoring any potential tax
benefits, because such obligations for some firms can allow managers to hold a
significant portion of a firm’s residual claim and can for all firms subject
managers to the consequences of payment default, including, perhaps,
dismissal. The result could be more productive managers. A firm might
rationally issue its fixed obligations to a large number of investors if no single
lender would be willing to provide all financing at all times—as might be the
case, or has been the case, for some large issuers. Or a firm might rationally
prefer to have multiple financing sources so as not to vest in any lender the
opportunity to behave strategically with respect to subsequent loans that only
an existing lender, given better information, could efficiently provide.
With the assumption in mind that large firms would issue a
significant amount of fixed obligations to multiple creditors, I imagined
340 (“Ideally, nonconsensual claimants would have highest priority in any sort of firm.”). This point,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
11 For an analysis of any such bargain’s financial consequences, see generally Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595 (1993).
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eliminating only a single feature of traditional debt: the right of an
individual fixed-obligation claimant to collect. This one feature is
significant because it is the feature of debt that creates the collective
action problem and the need for bankruptcy reorganization law.
Firms that issue fixed obligations to multiple investors might benefit from
a debt-free capital structure by avoiding the expense of financial
restructuring, either through bankruptcy or other means. This expense can be
significant when claimant negotiations deteriorate into an imbroglio, as they
frequently did at the time that I first engaged in this thought experiment
during the 1990s.12 Taking as given the desire to protect insolvent but viable
firms, it is not clear that anything significant would be lost by eliminating
collection rights.
Elimination of debt, and with it the individual creditor’s right to collect,
might cost little because there is an alternative collective remedy of which
fixed-obligation claimants could avail themselves. I argued that a firm could,
in principle, replace debt with a special variant of preferred equity. The
Chameleon Equity firm that would result would retain the benefits of fixed
obligations but would avoid the negative consequences of creditor
coordination failure—notably postdefault dismemberment of a viable firm.
In the simplest Chameleon Equity firm, if insolvency—defined as asset value
less than fixed obligations—led to default, default would eliminate the
preinsolvency common-equity class and would convert the lowest priority
fixed-obligation class to common equity. Any remaining senior class would
survive unaffected. At any given time, management would represent the
firm’s current common-equity class.
Significantly, even in a complex firm, one with a variety of fixed-obligation
priorities, no court would have to preserve the higher obligations’ priority. The
senior obligations would retain their priority because they would survive
complete with fixed claims. This would free the firm to adopt a tiered hierarchy
of priority classes that would keep the firm almost eternally solvent and almost
eternally subject to significant fixed obligations. In the end, every claimant would
get the priority for which it contracted. And although there would be questions
of default and liability, as there are now in traditional firms, there would be no
12 For an estimate from that time of bankruptcy reorganization’s direct costs, see Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 288-90
(1990), in which the author examines the direct costs of bankruptcy, including the legal, professional,
and administrative fees associated with bankruptcy filing. There are, moreover, indirect costs that will
not be reflected in ex post measurements of financial distress costs. That is, there are costs from the
tendency of expensive bankruptcy proceedings to reallocate a firm’s value from high- to low-priority
claims, thus reducing the value of high-priority claims to firms that wish to issue such claims. See, e.g.,
Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 9, at 440; Alan Schwartz, The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm’s
Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1214 (1994) (arguing that a relaxed absolute priority rule
“worsens investment incentives”).
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postinsolvency restructuring expense even where the auction of the debtor as a
going concern were not a viable option. A Chameleon Equity firm would have
to bear the initial transaction costs of adopting the Chameleon Equity structure.
But it is difficult to imagine that these costs would be, in the long run, anything
but trivial additions to the current costs of contracting for corporate charters and
bond covenants. In short, corporate bankruptcy would appear to be unjustified.
Even then, I was not so naive as to believe that abolition of bankruptcy or
firm selection of a Chameleon Equity structure was imminent or even
possible. In my original paper on Chameleon Equity, I described a list of legal
and other impediments to a Chameleon Equity structure.13 These include tax,
commercial, corporate, and tort law.14 I also offered a public choice
explanation for the persistence of these impediments.15 Nevertheless, in
principle, a world without debt or bankruptcy and with contractual solutions
to the collective action problem seemed an efficient world.
III. THE REAL WORLD
These proposals for contractual alternatives to bankruptcy were perhaps
intriguing, and they certainly produced some interesting debates before the
turn of the new millennium.16 But these academic debates did not, then or
since, influence policy. Moreover, it was not only legislators who failed to take
up the call. To my chagrin, despite dizzying financial innovation, debtors and
investors did not attempt the firm-wide Chameleon Equity structure I
proposed.17 To be sure, as noted above, I had identified legal impediments to
13
14
15
16

Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 9, at 333-41.
Id.
Id. at 341-46.
A sampling of these debates emerged from Washington University School of Law’s
Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Theory. See Adler, supra note 4; James
W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy
Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955, 956-57 (1994) (describing the misgivings of the academic
community regarding bankruptcy’s efficiency in the late 1980s and early 1990s); Samuel L. Bufford,
What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 839 (1994)
(questioning the usefulness of Chameleon Equity in the vast majority of bankruptcy cases); Karen
Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 103738 (1994) (noting that conference proposals for alternatives to the bankruptcy system fail to address
problems on the human level); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1193 (1994) (“Despite [some] gains, the move to an
automatic cancellation system [like Chameleon Equity] would not be unambiguously beneficial.”);
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1257, 1261 (1994) (discussing how both Chameleon Equity and a menu-based bankruptcy alternative
would require “a major reform of tort law, of the law governing obligations owed to government
entities, and of laws governing other obligations to involuntary creditors”).
17 Bail-in bonds issued in Europe after the 2008 financial crisis look much like the Chameleon
Equity obligations I proposed, but these bail-in bonds, referred to in recent literature also as
contingent convertible, or CoCo, bonds, replace only the most junior levels of debt.
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Chameleon Equity, but I became unconvinced that these impediments were
so formidable as to prevent even attempts at the proposed capital structure if
that structure were as valuable as I had claimed it might be.
Perhaps, then, Chameleon Equity or any other contractual alternative to
corporate bankruptcy is theoretically sound but offers only insignificant
advantages over even an imperfect, but largely functioning, bankruptcy
regime such as that of the United States. It could be, therefore, that a
contractual alternative to resolve the collective action problem would be more
important elsewhere—in transitional economies, for instance.18
There is, however, a potentially more fundamental explanation for why
firms have not attempted to innovate toward a pure Chameleon Equity firm.
The potential explanation is that threat of liquidation in an asset-grab race by
dispersed holders of traditional debt may be a solution rather than a problem.
As I have previously observed,19 there are, theoretically, two approaches
to corporate insolvency. A system structured according to an ex post approach
relies on a court-supervised examination of a firm that cannot pay its debts
in full. If this examination reveals the firm to be viable despite its financial
distress, the firm restructures its liabilities, or is auctioned as a going concern,
and continues. Otherwise the firm ceases operation and is liquidated
piecemeal. Corporate bankruptcy laws in the United States and in other
countries adopt this approach. Under an alternative, ex ante approach,
investors would instead abide by the consequences of predictions made at the
time of investment about a firm’s likely value and attributes should it become
unable to pay its debts. Unless initial investment contracts provided
otherwise, a firm’s failure to satisfy its obligations would subject its assets to
collection without any after-the-fact attempt to determine whether the firm
were economically viable. Viable firms could be liquidated in the process. But
such an ex ante approach may be optimal, despite any contrary intuition.20
A misapprehension of financial economics gives rise to the intuition that
a proper insolvency system must screen firms that should live from those
that should die. It is an axiom of finance theory that a firm’s financial
health—its ability to pay its debts—is not synonymous with the firm’s
economic health—its ability to provide goods or services efficiently. Thus, if
insolvency provided no clue as to a firm’s viability, legal rules that permitted
a firm’s immediate dismemberment at the hands of unconstrained creditors
might waste much value. But a firm’s insolvency, as signaled by the firm’s
18 In a separate paper, I have argued just that. See Barry E. Adler, Bernard Petrie Professor of
Law & Bus., N.Y. Univ., Keynote Address at the Tsinghua University Law School Sixteenth
International Twenty-First Century Commercial Law Forum: Contractual Corporate-Insolvency
Resolution in Transitional Economies (Oct. 2016) (on file with author).
19 See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1997).
20 Id.
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default on its debt, may provide a strong clue as to the firm’s viability.
Financial distress need not randomly befall good and bad firms alike.
Because investors choose an initial capital structure, they may adopt a debt
component that renders unlikely the simultaneous occurrence of insolvency
and viability. Consequently, investors might well prefer insolvency rules that
channel few resources into distinguishing firms that should continue from
those that should liquidate, even if the result is routine liquidation.
So perhaps the reason firms do not innovate toward a contractual
collective insolvency proceeding is that the innovation they’d really like is
abjuration of a collective proceeding. This is an attractive hypothesis in part
because there are numerous examples of debtors that attempt to exempt
individual creditors from the bankruptcy process—borrowing through
Special Purpose Entities, for example.21 And although we don’t see firms
attempting to opt out of bankruptcy entirely, this may well be because it
is, or has been, commonly believed that such an opt-out would not be
honored under current bankruptcy law, an avowed purpose of which is to
refinance viable but insolvent debtors. That is, while there may be only
weak legal barriers to a Chameleon Equity structure, which facilitates
debtor rescue, there may be an impenetrable barrier or an advanced
disavowal of such rescue.
Although this analysis does represent a challenge to the creditors’ bargain
hypothesis, I have not before described it as such primarily because these
conclusions rest on what I myself describe as an untestable hypothesis.
Debtors do not attempt a wholesale opt-out of bankruptcy’s collective
proceeding. Jacksonians (and perhaps Jackson himself) attribute this to debtor
satisfaction with collectivization. I attribute the same behavior to apathy

21 In his thoughtful comments at this conference, Ted Janger questioned the relevance of my
observation that some debtors attempt to exempt some creditors from bankruptcy’s collective
process. He took a Rawlsian approach to the matter and suggested that while creditors behind a veil
of ignorance would opt in to collectivization, those whom we see opting out know their place in the
pecking order and perceive an advantage in doing so. This is an interesting observation but also
largely inapposite. It is important to keep in mind that the creditors’ bargain is, like the Rawlsian
veil, only a metaphor. If bankruptcy reflects the creditors’ bargain, then it also reflects the debtors’
interests. As noted in the introduction to this Article, in a competitive capital market, creditors are
mere stakeholders for debtor interests. Truly relevant, then, is the credit-collection regime the
debtors choose. Consequently, if a debtor attempts to exempt a particular creditor from the
bankruptcy process, it is the debtor’s choice, not the creditor’s, and such an attempt at exemption is
an indication that the debtor does not believe collectivization minimizes its cost of capital. This is
so, at least, if the attempted exemption precedes the issuance of other debt, as may be the situation
in at least some debtor adoptions of special interest vehicles, for example. In any case, the speculation
made here is that debtors would, if given the choice, opt out of collectivization from the start, before
any credit is issued, and while all creditors, prospectively, might be said to be behind the veil of
ignorance. This is, moreover, how I understand the practitioners’ conjecture on their clients’ desire
to opt out of bankruptcy, a conjecture described in the introduction.

1862

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 1853

given the perceived futility of action. This is a thin reed—and, as explained
above, one I’ve relied on before, to my regret. That said, given recent events,
and for reasons I’ll next address, I’ve now grown (slightly) bolder.
IV. THE END OF BANKRUPTCY
In the opening paragraph of a widely read and highly regarded article,
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen describe a sea change in bankruptcy
reorganization as that process had been practiced and understood:
Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make
headlines when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to
rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their
assets and divide up the proceeds. TWA filed only to consummate the sale of
its planes and landing gates to American Airlines. Enron’s principal assets,
including its trading operation and its most valuable pipelines, were sold
within a few months of its bankruptcy petition. Within weeks of filing for
Chapter 11, Budget sold most of its assets to the parent company of Avis.
Similarly, Polaroid entered Chapter 11 and sold most of its assets to the
private equity group at BankOne. Even when a large firm uses Chapter 11 as
something other than a convenient auction block, its principal lenders are
usually already in control and Chapter 11 merely puts in place a preexisting
deal. Rarely is Chapter 11 a forum where the various stakeholders in a publicly
held firm negotiate among each other over the firm’s destiny.22

That article, although written not long after those described in the prior
sections of this Article, describes a marked transformation in bankruptcy
reorganization as that process had been practiced and as it had been
understood at the time of those earlier writings.
At the risk of oversimplification, what Baird and Rasmussen describe is a
shift away from a potentially expensive imbroglio over valuation and
entitlement to a rapid disposition. This disposition may take the form of either
a free-and-clear sale of the assets to the highest bidder followed by a
distribution of proceeds down the priority waterfall or, simpler still, a turnover
of the assets to a united group of lenders whose priority claims would go
unsatisfied, despite taking all, leaving no valid complaint for downstream
creditors. One might say, then, that what Baird and Rasmussen describe is not
so much the end of bankruptcy, but its evolution toward its ideal.
That bankruptcy has evolved, and is not truly at an end, is significant for
the purposes of this Article because the changes that Baird and Rasmussen
describe do not include an elimination of a collective proceeding. In the new
22

Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 751-52 (footnotes omitted).
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world of corporate bankruptcy, there is perhaps little traditional
reorganization, but assets are held together away from individual creditor
collection until the court can decide what to do with them. The assets may
eventually be sold in piecemeal liquidation, as in the examples given by Baird
and Rasmussen, but they may instead be sold as a going concern if that brings
the best price. Alternatively, assets are held together until the court can
determine that the firm belongs to and can be run, or disposed of, by what
Baird and Rasmussen describe as the “principal creditors.”
This is not to say that the changes in corporate bankruptcy are irrelevant
for the question of whether a collective proceeding is desirable; far from it.
Rather these changes increase the plausibility that collectivization does not,
in fact, reflect the creditors’ implicit bargain.
The anecdotal list of liquidations in the Baird and Rasmussen article is
supported by more formal analysis: in the new world of corporate bankruptcy,
it is now common even for publicly traded firms to disappear rather than
continue, in any form or under any ownership, as going concerns.23 So in the
years since I first speculated in the Chameleon Equity article that corporate
bankruptcy is unnecessary for a firm with a capital structure designed to
accommodate insolvency and default, it seems that just such structures have
arisen, though not in the way I originally imagined. The high liquidation rate
in bankruptcy, just mentioned, is testament to the fact that by the time
bankruptcy is available to rescue debtors from the wolves, there may well be
nothing to rescue. For such firms, the imposition of bankruptcy’s stay on
individual creditor action may do little more than interfere with and delay the
redeployment of assets, which creditors could otherwise quickly claim and sell.
To be sure, not all debtors that enter bankruptcy are worth more dead
than alive. As noted above, the liquidation of viable debtors, if few enough,
could be a price worth paying if freedom from bankruptcy’s collective process
permitted the unhindered liquidation of the rest. But even that price would
not be as high as may first appear. For the viable debtors, it is important to
consider the role of “principal creditors.” It is now common, more common
even than when Baird and Rasmussen wrote, for debtors to enter bankruptcy
entirely pledged to a senior secured creditor—or a consortium of or trustee
for such creditors—who will under no circumstances be repaid in full. Under
principles of absolute priority, such creditors are entitled to the entire firm
and have an incentive to keep its business afloat should the firm remain
economically viable despite even a dire financial situation. Presumably, these
principal creditors—the dominance of which in large part prompted a
23 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Larry Weiss, Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter
11, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 461, 464 (2013) (referring to a collection of empirical studies that support
anecdotal accounts of a shift toward creditor control and liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings).
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significant reform effort by the American Bankruptcy Institute24—could be
expected to assert their property interest ahead of other creditors even
without bankruptcy intervention,25 which may impede more than protect.
While Baird and Rasmussen may have been premature in declaring the
end of corporate bankruptcy, perhaps their title was aspirational, or, at least,
one can argue that it should have been if the purpose of bankruptcy is to
prevent a creditor race to assets.
V. CONCLUSION AND THOUGHTS ON ASSET LAUNDERING
As noted at the start of this Article, these remarks were prompted by
conversations at conferences such as the one for which the Article was written.
In these conversations among academics and practicing lawyers, sophisticated
practitioners gave the impression or stated outright that investors would, if they
could, forswear the bankruptcy process. And my hope is that what I’ve written
here will provoke a more focused consideration of that prospect.
Before concluding, though, I want to add another topic to the mix—an idea
also prompted by conversation among academics and practitioners. Although
there may be an implicit consensus that lenders are not particularly interested
in forced collectivization, there is apparently a strong interest in another aspect
of the bankruptcy process: free-and-clear dispositions. Without the cleansing
available by a sale of assets through bankruptcy, or a discharge upon Chapter 11
plan confirmation, purchasers or creditors are at risk that state law actions will
follow assets into the hands of a solvent entity.26 This prospect would be
unwelcome as well as unwise if the disposition of assets from an insolvent
debtor failed to cure the insolvency problem, requiring another disposition, and
so on. And the prospect would be unwelcome to some creditors, though not
necessarily unwise, if it effectively elevated the priority of these asset-following
24 See AM. BANKR. INST., AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
214-24 (2014) (“Throughout their deliberations, the Commissioners held lengthy and thoughtful
discussions concerning the rights of senior creditors in bankruptcy and how best to balance these rights
with the reorganization needs of the debtor and the interests of other stakeholders.”).
25 It is sometimes claimed that the bankruptcy process is necessary for a secured creditor to
enforce a blanket lien on all assets, including the debtor’s going-concern value. One might wonder
whether a creditor who claims a blanket lien in bankruptcy should prevail if the claimed interest is
unenforceable under state law. Even if a blanket lien is both legitimate and unenforceable under
state law, it is not the classic Jacksonian collectivity function that is served when bankruptcy enforces
such a lien in competition with junior creditors who, as a result of the lien, lack any claim to the
debtor’s assets. Put another way, adjudication of the winner in a grab race is not the same function
as elimination of that race. And although an adjudication of a lien’s validity prior to bankruptcy or
state foreclosure proceedings entails a temporary suspension of asset distribution, such interference
with creditor collection could be minimal.
26 See supra note 25.
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claims, which may be nonconsensual and thus entitled under nonbankruptcy
law to no special priority. 27
So corporate bankruptcy may be desirable after all, even today. But
bankruptcy’s principal function may be asset laundering, not collectivization,
the brilliant Jacksonian paradigm notwithstanding.

27

See supra note 10.

*

*

*

*

*

